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Apache Vulnerability Announced
from the lame-DOS-attacks dept.
ISS has tarnished themselves; badly (Score:1)
Really bad move there, many people are going to see things from them in the future and think "Hey, these assholes again,
Smooth move.
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
Apache means quality. (Score:5, Insightful)
I have to say, the Apache web server is quite a high quality piece of work. The fact that an obscure security issue has been found is a good sign that developers and users are on top of things in the constant struggle against remote exploiters.
I am confident that a fix will be available very shortly. Serious sysadmins will have their servers patched sooner than any serious damage takes place. I don't have the same confidence when it comes to Microsoft's products.
- Re:Apache means quality. by Tom7 (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @05:39PM
- Re:Apache means quality. by MisterBlister (Score:1) Tuesday June 18 2002, @03:42AM
- Re:Apache means quality. by bigberk (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @08:56PM
ISS Responds (Score:4, Informative)
---
ISS has requested that I forward this response to the list.
----------
This vulnerability was originally detected auditing the Apache 2.0 source
tree. Apache 2.0 uses the same function to determine the chunk size, and
has the same vulnerable signed comparison. It is, however, not vulnerable
(by luck?) due to a signed comparison deep within the buffered reading
routines (within core_input_filter).
This issue is no more exploitable or unexploitable on a 32-bit platform than
on a 64-bit platform. Due to the signed comparison, the minimum size passed
to the memcpy() function is 0x80000000 or about 2gb. Unless Apache has over
2gb of contiguous stack memory located after the target buffer in memory, a
segmentation fault will be caused. If you understand how the stack is used,
you will understand that this is an impossibility.
Apache on "Win32" is not exploitable due to any "64-bit" addressing issues.
It is easily exploitable due to the nature of structured exception handling
on Windows and the fact that exception handler pointers are stored on the
stack.
If the DoS vulnerability is related to the overflow then the ISS patch will
work to prevent it. The unsigned comparison prevents any stack overflow and
as a result any related DoS issue is prevented. If the DoS issue is
unrelated, then of course the ISS patch will not be of any help.
ISS X-Force
----
Official Apache Project Security Advisory (Score:3, Informative)
Versions of the Apache web server up to and including 1.3.24 and 2.0 up to and including 2.0.36 contain a bug in the routines which deal with invalid requests which are encoded using chunked encoding. This bug can be triggered remotely by sending a carefully crafted invalid request. This functionality is enabled by default.
In most cases the outcome of the invalid request is that the child process dealing with the request will terminate. At the least, this could help a remote attacker launch a denial of service attack as the parent process will eventually have to replace the terminated child process and starting new children uses non-trivial amounts of resources.
We were also notified today by ISS that they had published the same issue which has forced the early release of this advisory. Please note that the patch provided by ISS does not correct this vulnerability.
The Apache Software Foundation are currently working on new releases that fix this issue; please stay tuned here at http://httpd.apache.org/ for updated versions as they become available.
[Link to full advisory follows at
http://httpd.apache.org/info/security_bulletin_20
- Official CERT Advisory CA-2002-17 by dananderson (Score:2) Monday June 17 2002, @10:50PM
Open vs. Closed source (Score:2)
Putting aside the issue of ISS releasing it too early or the amount of bugs MS products have...
Since Apache is open source, ANYONE can look at the code and do some debugging. We don't have to wait for a coding team to code it, a debugging team to debug it, a compiling team to compile it, a testing team to test it....
Doesn't open source speed up the entire process since any amount of coders can do the patching? I would assume that the Apache team already has a boatload of patch candidates sitting in their inbox right now.
The true nature of open source is the fact that MANY coders can review the source. I'm sure a million bugs were PREVENTED already because some guy out in Kansas said "hey dude...you don't want to do it like this. try this..."
impartiality (Score:1)
A certain web server product has a security hole.
Is it open source?
"Believe it or not, reports that XXX has a certain vulnerability. Amazing, we could hardly believe it. We had tested the vulnerability TEN TIMES before running this story...".
Is it NOT open source, and perhaps even made by a certain larger corporation?
"HAH! More reports that XXX is an absolute joke, about as secure as a plastic bag. The l4m3rs at XXX corp took three YEARS to produce a patch, which is now available. The vulnerability this time allows you to take over the sysadmin's computer if he/she is playing mine sweeper..."
That said of course I would use Apache over IIS anyday
The only thing funnier... (Score:2)
Heh. (Score:2)
Nice
No problem (Score:2)
Question for ISS? (Score:1)
According to the FAQ [apache.org] from the Apache Software Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation, incorporated in Delaware, USA, in June of 1999. I'm surprised that the all knowing X-Force was nto able to find this information.
Fix available: 1.3.26 (Score:3, Informative)
For mirrors:
http://www.apache.org/dyn/closer.cgi/httpd/ [apache.org]
For direct download:
http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/ [apache.org]
For the announcement:
http://httpd.apache.org/ [apache.org]
- mod_ssl and Apache 1.3.26 by dananderson (Score:2) Wednesday June 19 2002, @12:43AM
- Re:mod_ssl and Apache 1.3.26 by cliffwoolley (Score:1) Thursday June 20 2002, @11:16PM
- Re:Fix available: 1.3.26 by dananderson (Score:1) Wednesday June 19 2002, @11:14AM
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
Already fixed (Score:1)
To all responsible sys-admins out there: go get the patch(ed version)!
(Another day, another bug squashed in under 2 days).
Apache decided the ISS fix does work (Score:1)
Re:Fix for 1.3.x tree? (Score:2, Informative)
- OFFICIAL STATUS UPDATE (Re:Fix for 1.3.x tree?) by cliffwoolley (Score:2) Tuesday June 18 2002, @12:48AM
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
Re:Incoming (Score:4, Insightful)
Consider an application has a vulnerability. After an interval elapses, a patch is released, and peace and order is returned to the world.
If it is an Open Source product, it is lauded as a benefit of the methodology. With "millions of eyes on the code," a problem, once identified, can be resolved. The system works!
If it is Microsoft, the problem is the closed source. If it was open source, either the problem wouldn't be there in the first place, or the fix would come out faster. It is just another show of how it lacks.
This artical, IMHO, is proof that just because it is Open Source does not mean it is bug (or vulernability) free.
As for the time-to-fix, the examples I am used to hearing from the Open Source community is that the patch can be out in a number of hours. I question how much testing went on in the fix in terms of bredth of hardware and software integration, etc. The impression I left with is someone went out and whipped up something that appears to fix the problem. The initial fix plugs the hole, then others come behind them and make it better integrated (i.e. fewer bugs, etc.).
What is the problem with this? None, I suppose. However, I fail to understand how this is really better, other than the fact that some "beta" code was released "in hours". Certainly not so much better than it merits all the looking-down-the-nose at other platforms.
I also have a pet theory, which I often state. One of the reasons all crackers et al. go after Microsoft product is that they are widely used, and that showing their failings through breaking them gains them esteme on boards such as this one. Typcially, someone breaking in to an IIS site is condemed, but rather the SysAdmins for using IIS (regardless of application, corporate, or other requirements). This comes accross as condoning this behavior, and causes more people to do more damange.
No, I don't think that doing otherwise will minimize the number of vulnerabilities or attacks, nor do I feel vulnerabilities shouldn't be fixed.
- Re:Incoming by gilroy (Score:2) Monday June 17 2002, @04:34PM
- Re:Incoming by javahacker (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @04:39PM
- Re:Incoming by jeremyp (Score:2) Tuesday June 18 2002, @07:49AM
- IIS Configuration by javahacker (Score:1) Tuesday June 18 2002, @10:24AM
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
- Re:Incoming by alfaiomega (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @07:56PM
- Re:Incoming by 0x0d0a (Score:2) Tuesday June 18 2002, @07:14PM
- 3 replies beneath your current threshold.
Re:"uninformed and questionable"? (Score:1)
- Re:"uninformed and questionable"? by markcox (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @04:57PM
Re:Fix for 1.3.x tree? (Score:3, Informative)
Meanwhile, if you HAVE to use Apache 2.0, run PHP as CGI and you will avoid the version hassle (ofcourse loosing on performance etc). Anyway, it won't take long now to have PHP4 working good as module with 2.x, as the big guys are saying that the Apache API is now kind of stabile for 2.x series.
Re:Fix for 1.3.x tree? (Score:2, Informative)
Install Apache from source, then configure PHP with --with-apxs2=/path/to/apache2/bin/apxs and install.
Do the x-httpd-application
- Re:Fix for 1.3.x tree? by AnotherSteve (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @04:29PM
Re:This is Good News for Linux (Score:1)
- 2 replies beneath your current threshold.
Re:Let the spinning begin! (Score:2)
There's no point in spinning this, nor any real need. It's a bug, it has specific consequences cited in the story, it should be fixed.
Spinning would be to point out how few remote exploits have been discovered in Apache over the last 4 years compared to IIS, and the fact that Apache's exploit count (if this is exploitable) is not zero doesn't mean that it's not still a whole lot less so far than IIS.
Re:don't believe the FUD (Score:1)
- Re:don't believe the FUD by caluml (Score:1) Monday June 17 2002, @05:25PM
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
- Re:don't believe the FUD by Old Wolf (Score:2) Monday June 17 2002, @06:46PM
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
- Re:don't believe the FUD by cliffwoolley (Score:1) Tuesday June 18 2002, @01:13AM
Re:don't believe the FUD (Score:2, Interesting)
If anything, this hole just serves (ha!) as a reminder of how superior Apache and open source are in general. Only a fool would use anything else.
I guess that fool is me. Been an IIS user for years. Never r00ted. Not once.
It's called "good system administration."
- 2 replies beneath your current threshold.
Re:Hah, the hypocrisy... (Score:1)
seriously, if you want people to not make fun of your name, then don't claim that you wrote the linux kernel then, or else people will just think you're a bad parody trying to piss every linux user off
- Re:Hah, the hypocrisy... by getter_85 (Score:1) Thursday June 20 2002, @12:38PM
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
- 1 reply beneath your current threshold.
Switch to IIS (Score:4, Funny)
Re:Switch to IIS (Score:4, Funny)
Yes, they tried but it's hard to get people to work on weekends.
Enough Already (Score:5, Insightful)
...oh, wait.
You mean *nix admins actually have to worry about patches and service packs too?
Don't get me wrong, I don't intend this to be an "I told you so!" from the MS camp to the *nix camp, but rather a polite reminder that all admins have to keep up with their patches, service packs, and whatever. You can't just install Apache and let it go. You need to know what you're doing.
There's a difference between an "admin" and "someone who installed some software".
Re:Enough Already (Score:5, Insightful)
The reason Microsoft patches are released close to when bugs are announced is because most security researchers withhold their reports until the vendor has a patch ready. Responsible disclosure and all. Eeye discovered the latest
A lot of noise? (Score:1)
Not enough time!! (Score:2, Funny)
A bug in open source code? (Score:2, Funny)
Useless bug announcements-- My turn! (Score:3, Funny)
Finally... (Score:1)
echo Patch apache >> todo.txt
Debian (Score:1)
It's still better than IIS (Score:2, Insightful)
Apache team not trusted (Score:5, Interesting)
Turns out the ISS X-Force team doesn't trust the Apache crew to fix what seems to be a very serious exploitable bug in the http code. They just released an advisory to the Bugtraq mailing list here [securityfocus.com] and provided some 'patch code'. The patch code (which attempted to typcast the vulnerable area) doesn't seem to fix the issue.
So in effect there are a bunch of Apache servers out there with a possibly remote exploitable buffer overflow. Was this a big ooops on the part of ISS?
One has to wonder why they didn't go to the Apache team first with this? Rumor has it that ISS feels that Red Hat has burned them (ISS) in the past and since the Apache team has some Red Hat employees they shouldn't be trusted.
Another rumor that has been floating is that the ISS team doesn't consider Apache to be "a vendor" and therefore doesn't need to follow the normal disclosure rules. This sets a pretty bad precedant of not working with vendors just because you don't get along with them. A companies personal pettiness should not be allowed to override the security of a majority of the internets websites. The patch has offically made it into the Apache CVS but again why the hell didn't ISS talk with Apache? I noticed another post by NGGS (referenced in link above) that they already had a CVS number so they appeared to have gone through the proper channels and got 'beat to the punch' by ISS. Sounds like a motive to me....
Re:Apache team not trusted (Score:4, Informative)
- len_to_read = (r->remaining > bufsiz) ? bufsiz : r->remaining;
to
+ len_to_read = (r->remaining > (unsigned int)bufsiz) ? bufsiz : r->remaining
is _not_ a fix. It's a total kludge. If a variable can contain a value that exceeds the range of its type, such that it has a different value when cast to unsigned type, the _the variable is of the wrong type_, and _that's_ the problem that needs to be fixed.
This is nothing but lousy Elastoplast.
FP.
Re:Apache team not trusted (Score:4, Insightful)
To pick a nit, on a number of architectures, the difference is not in the code to compare the quantities but the code in the conditional jump. Somehow casting a signed value to an unsigned value sounds like an opportunity for lots of subtle mischief. The Apache team is wise to examine this stuff carefully and not let themselves get panicked into doing something stupid.
Thoughts on this hole (Score:4, Interesting)
(B) Better question: Why is ISS releasing a poorly researched hole (they didn't even know that Apache 2.x had it) and a worthless patch prior to contacting the vendor? Premature ejaculation here or WHAT?
I fail to see what their hurry was, lest their market share is dipping and they really needed to beat someone (such as David Litchfield?) to the punch.
This is completely irresponsible. There are scores of devices that use Apache embedded. These manufacturers and THEIR clients now need to come up with something *fast* to get locked down.
F'n genius....
Full disclosure and reputations... (Score:4, Interesting)
1) They are unable to fully understand the nature of a discovered flaw
2) They are unable to release a patch that solves the problem (demonstrating a lack of a good QA process)
3) They have demonstrated an inability to work effectively with industry leading software developers
I don't know about you, but I'd be hard pressed to trust my business or even my home data to the security of an organization that is so apparently incompetent. They have a lot of 'splaining to do.
Bugs Apply To All Software (Score:1)
Impact on *nix platforms (Score:5, Informative)
Due to the nature of the overflow on 32-bit Unix platforms this will cause a segmentation violation and the child will terminate. However on 64-bit platforms the overflow can be controlled and so for platforms that store return addresses on the stack it is likely that it is further exploitable. This could allow arbitrary code to be run on the server as the user the Apache children are set to run as.
It seems that thanks to the *nix way of handling processes and their childs, this represents minor threat than on other platforms, in which it is even more easily exploitable as a DOS attack. However, this is not minor news eve for us using *nix breeds.
ISS patch is not complete (Score:5, Interesting)
----
The patch that mentioned casting bufsiz from an int to an unsigned int
failed to do a few things:
1) There are 2 instances of the same code in http_protocol.c that need
to be fixed, as both suffer from the same problem
2) The cast to unsigned int was only done in comparison, and was not
done in assignment, which could possibly lead to problems down the road
with the int value?
I haven't checked any of this, just noticed it and was really just
wondering "why wasn't this done?".
The code that is apparently "buggy" is this:
len_to_read = (r->remaining > bufsiz) ? bufsiz : r->remaining;
The code was mentioned to be changed to this:
len_to_read = (r->remaining > (unsigned int)bufsiz) ? bufsiz
r->remaining;
However, this doesn't assign that casted value to len_to_read, it just
uses the cast for comparison and then passes on the possibly bogus data
on to len_to_read.
So, should the fix not be to change it to:
len_to_read = (r->remaining > (unsigned int)bufsiz) ? (unsigned
int)bufsiz : r->remaining;
Also, like I mentioned, there are two places where this happens in
http_protocol.c, one at line 2062, and the other (the one mentioned in
the patch) at 2174.
-----
Double standard (Score:2, Insightful)
So your company publicizes a bug for IIS, you're a hero. Publicize one for Apache, you're now "uninformed and questionable"? Geez.
It's not just a DoS (Score:2)
doesnt it saw "windows version"? (Score:1)
If you're running on a sane OS, The bug seeme negligable.. so a few people will have to hit reload if they try to do funny stuff.
(It's not easy foreseeing 'issues' with dealing with a non-open or standardized OS)
isnt using a good server software on an OS that really WAS NOT made for server functions sort of like using a bandaid to cover up leporacy? (sp?)
Oh lovely (Score:1)
What happened to disclosure lead times? (Score:5, Interesting)
What happened to the lead time given to a software vendor before publishing a vulnerability ? I thought that all professional 'sploit hunters honoured this.
The idea is to give the vendor time to produce a patch so that when you announce the vulnerability there is an official patch available. It's 22:16 here now and I'll be sat up half the night waiting to see if Apache release a patch because I have around 20 servers that run Apache, and I can't sleep until I know they're secure.
I'm all for full disclosure, but I much prefer RESPONSIBLE full disclosure. If anyone from IIS is reading this, you're a bunch of immature mornons. Play by the rules or fuck off!
Scuse me (Score:1)
Ok can someone PLEASE explain what this report is about? Can you or can you not cause a stack overwrite on x86 Linux? it says that 32 bit unices it won't work; how is the stack handling different from 'doze? it then goes on to say that 64 bit architectures can be exploited and that "Apache 1.3 on windows is exploitable in this way". Apache on windows == 32 bit != 64 bit!
Someone care to clarify?
Most can wait for a patch (Score:2)
"X-Force has verified that this issue is exploitable on Apache for Windows (Win32) version 1.3.24. Apache 1.x for Unix contains the same source code, but X-Force believes that successful exploitation on most Unix platforms is unlikely."
Sounds to me like it's nothing more than your basic overflow. While the article from Apache mentions the possible execution of code, I think they're referring to the Windows platform. Since all daemons have full security (root) on Windows, it makes sense that an attacker could run malicious code on a Windows machine. With *nix, Apache runs as nobody (by default, anyway) so attackers can't run any code as root, greatly reducing the amount of damage other than a DoS.
It also mentions that the overflow consumes more resources on Windows, since on *nix it's only a child process restarting rather than the ENTIRE process restarting.
Since there's no proof of concept issued yet, it's unlikely that a widespread attack will occur before a patch is issued.
Don't point the finger at ISS. (Score:1, Troll)
The fact is, I do trust the Apache group... (Score:5, Insightful)
Unfortunately, the exploit clock is now actively running which, no thanks to ISS, was an otherwise unnecessary hassle. That said however, I am confident that hundreds of very concerned and capable open source programmers will be able to outpace the dozen or so overworked and underpaid software engineers who have the misfortune of handling Microsoft's IIS holes.
Lastly, the vendors who provide Apache in their distributions do not have a monopoly on the market place. Their response time is critical to their relationship with their customers. Microsoft, by comparison, has no such relationship with their customers. Having personally been on the receiving end of many thousands of hours of Microsoft's service contracts, partnership deals, inside promotions, and developer support, I can safely say that we spent a lot of money for nothing. Microsoft ignores their preferred partners and Fortune 500 customers just as much as they discount the average desktop user. Through various positions, I've participated directly in all three cases, and after years of poor support from Microsoft, Linux has become a necessary and major factor in how I do business.
-Hope
Too good (Score:3, Funny)
Please note that the patch provided by ISS does not correct this vulnerability.
Will upgrading to 32-bit color on my hard drive fix it or do I need to upgrade my monitor refresh rate to 512MB?
ISS posts a response (Score:1)
----------
This vulnerability was originally detected auditing the Apache 2.0 source
tree. Apache 2.0 uses the same function to determine the chunk size, and
has the same vulnerable signed comparison. It is, however, not vulnerable
(by luck?) due to a signed comparison deep within the buffered reading
routines (within core_input_filter).
This issue is no more exploitable or unexploitable on a 32-bit platform than
on a 64-bit platform. Due to the signed comparison, the minimum size passed
to the memcpy() function is 0x80000000 or about 2gb. Unless Apache has over
2gb of contiguous stack memory located after the target buffer in memory, a
segmentation fault will be caused. If you understand how the stack is used,
you will understand that this is an impossibility.
Apache on "Win32" is not exploitable due to any "64-bit" addressing issues.
It is easily exploitable due to the nature of structured exception handling
on Windows and the fact that exception handler pointers are stored on the
stack.
If the DoS vulnerability is related to the overflow then the ISS patch will
work to prevent it. The unsigned comparison prevents any stack overflow and
as a result any related DoS issue is prevented. If the DoS issue is
unrelated, then of course the ISS patch will not be of any help.
ISS X-Force
Updates (Score:1)
IIUC (Score:2)
Question: where do I change the default "chunk encoding" response to an invalid request?
Some more data (Score:3, Interesting)
And, by the way, we have extrated the critical patch [uni-stuttgart.de] from the 1.3.x CVS (currently skipping mod_proxy), created a Debian package [uni-stuttgart.de] containing it, and written a German notice [uni-stuttgart.de] (still preliminary) for our free security newsletter [uni-stuttgart.de]. (The Debian package will be updated as new changes appear in the Apache CVS